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Abstract
How do the labels left and right take on meaning in new democracies? Existing ex-
planations point to the universality of the left-right scheme or, reversely, emphasize
regionally dominant social cleavages. We propose an alternative legacy-focused theory
based on two observations: dictatorships are not ideologically neutral, and are nega-
tively evaluated by most citizens and elites after democratization. These premises lead
us to expect that when the authoritarian regime is associated with the left (right), the
citizens of a new democracy will display an anti-left (anti-right) bias in their left-right
self-identification. We test this hypothesis across Latin American and European new
democracies. We find significant bias, which in the case of new democracies following
left-wing regimes is concealed due to inter-cohort heterogeneity. While older cohorts
denote a positive bias, cohorts born after Stalin’s era denote negative bias against the
left. Consistent with our expectations, repression exacerbates this bias whereas indoc-
trination mitigates it. Finally, we look at how these biases apply to party preferences.
The findings have important implications for understanding of authoritarian legacies
and party system development in new democracies.
Keywords: left-right; anti-dictator bias; indoctrination; Post-Communism;
Latin America
Party competition is almost unthinkable without a spatial representation of both voters and
parties along an ideological dimension (Brady 2011). Ideological classifications such as “left”
and “right” help political parties to brand (?) and package (Zechmeister 2006) policy pro-
posals and allow voters to cope with political issues in the context of imperfect information
(Downs 1957); form political identities (Claassen, Tucker and Smith 2015; Devine 2015); and
make political choices with limited awareness of the actual party policy positions (Adams,
Ezrow and Somer-Topcu 2011). But whereas parties’ long-run trajectories shape the sym-
bolic meaning of these ideological labels in established democracies (Arian and Shamir 1983;
Knutsen 1995), little is known about how these terms are understood in new democracies.
Existing explanations focus either on the role of pre-existing social cleavages (Evans and
Whitefield 1995; Kitschelt 1995, 1999; Tucker 2002; Whitefield 2002) or on factors that have
emerged after the democratic transition: elite coordination (Zechmeister 2006); party system
structuration (Harbers, de Vries and Steenbergen 2013); and trust in political institutions
(Doyle 2011).
We take a different route. We draw on a distinguishing feature of these countries, namely
the ideological connotations of their authoritarian past. The labels left and right are not a
monopoly of democratic party competition; on the contrary, the left-right scheme has played
a central role for the non-democratic regimes of the 20th century. Even though fascism—a
leading ideology of the inter-war period—lost significance after World War II (WWII), the
Cold War provided an unambiguous ideological context, leaving non-democratic regimes of
the post-WWII period to orient themselves into pro- and anti-communist camps. These dy-
namics are not captured by the existing democratization literature, which has mainly focused
on how the institutional features of non-democratic regimes conditioned their transition to
democracy (e.g. Boix and Stokes 2003; Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski
2007; Geddes 1999; Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Przeworski 2000; Remmer 1985; Svolik 2012).
Few studies have looked at the ideological connotations of non-democratic regimes (Gentile
2013; Levitsky and Way 2013; Linz 2000) and even fewer look at their legacies after democ-
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ratization (but see Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017; Torcal and Mainwaring 2003). This lacuna
is surprising given the resources dictators dedicate to controlling political language and dis-
seminating the regime ideology. In this paper, we directly address this gap by examining
whether and how the ideological connotations of autocracies colour the meaning of “left” and
“right” in third wave democracies in Latin America, Eastern and Southern Europe. In doing
so, we propose a new way of integrating the macro-level understanding of regime types and
the micro-level understanding of the formation left-right (LR) self-identification.
We argue that, in new democracies, people’s willingness to classify themselves as left-
or right-wing is shaped by a general reluctance to identify with the ideological label associ-
ated with the past authoritarian regime. As a result, people in new democracies will place
themselves further away from the end of left-right ideological spectrum associated with the
prior regime than they would have otherwise. We call this tendency anti-dictator bias. If the
past regime was left-wing as in the case of Eastern Europe, people will display an anti-left
bias, and if the prior regime was right-wing as in the cases of Latin America and Southern
Europe, people will display an anti-right bias.
We test our expectations with a harmonized dataset which covers 50 countries, 950
country-years, and two million individuals. We contrast both post-left-wing(LW) and post-
right-wing (RW) new democracies against the ideological benchmark provided by established
democracies. We find evidence for anti-dictator bias in both post-RW and post-LW democ-
racies, which seems to persist over time. We also try to shed some light on the mechanisms,
by examining within-regime heterogeneity in the magnitude of the effects, conditional on
two key characteristics of authoritarian regimes: repression and indoctrination. Our results
highlight the importance of prior regime indoctrination for explaining the strength of these
biases. Communist indoctrination in Eastern Europe had mitigating effects on anti-left bi-
ases among older generations. Finally, shifting our attention from ideological self-placement
to party preferences, we find that in democracies following right-wing regimes, right-wing
parties are additionally "penalized" by opposing voters. In Eastern Europe, we find that vot-
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ers dislike all opposing parties equally, and do not additionally penalize left-wing communist
successor parties.
Our paper makes contributions in three areas. Firstly, we provide a parsimonious expla-
nation for the cross-sectional variation in LR self-identification in Europe and Latin America
today. With respect to Europe, which experienced both right and left-wing dictatorships,
our explanation goes a long way in helping us understand cross-country variation in LR
self-placement, as depicted in Figure 1, which shows the average LR self-placement for each
country from the 2014 European Election Study. Secondly, we introduce ideological con-
notations of autocracies, as well as the modifying impact of regime characteristics, such
as repression and indoctrination, as new variables for understanding the source of LR self-
identification and party competition in third-wave new democracies. Finally, we contribute
to the growing understanding of the malleability of attachments to political “brands” (Lupu
2013) and the symbolic functions of ideological labels both as a short-cut for political choices
and as a source of group identities. The paper makes a novel contribution to this extensive
research by moving our focus beyond political parties as the primary objects of “left” and
“right” labels to the consideration of entire political regimes.
Figure 1: An Ideological Map of Europe
Source: European Election Study, 2014.
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Anti-Dictator Bias
The logic of anti-dictator bias rests on two principles. Firstly, autocracies are not ideolog-
ically neutral. Rather, they have either a left or right-wing association of which their own
citizens, post-transition elites and the world at large are aware of. Not all citizens have to be
aware of this link but a significant proportion need to for the argument to work. Secondly,
on the whole, repressive regimes are assessed negatively after the transition to democracy.
We do not preclude the possibility of anti-dictator bias extending beyond the labels to the
content of labels e.g. the policies, ideologies, and associated parties, but within the scope of
this paper, we concern ourselves with self-classifications using the ideological labels as the
first step to understanding the roots and dynamics of anti-dictator bias.
We start with the link between autocracies and the ideological labels left and right. While
the political left-right spectrum is a simple dyadic distinction, its power as a meaningful set
of categories lies in its relativity—in other words, its ability to acquire new meanings based
on changing historical and intellectual contexts (see Bobbio 1996). In the 20th century, the
conflicts between liberal democracy and anti-liberalism (fascism, communism, corporatism)
followed by the Cold War conflict between communism and capitalism helped to provide a
grand context that facilitated the attachment of meaning to the dyadic categories of left and
right.
The inevitable potential for an association between Communist regimes of Eastern Eu-
rope and the “left” end of the ideological spectrum can be taken as a given; Lenin (1920)
himself used the term “left-wing” in association with the communist parties of Europe. The
terms “left” and “right” were integral parts of the Marxist-Leninist political discourse, and
average citizens would be well aware of how their “left-wing” regimes are in conflict with the
"bourgeois right" and “reactionary rightist” regimes around the world (Robinson 1995). The
ruling communist parties—all members of the International—had full control of the state
and used their resources to spread a Marxist-Leninist worldview throughout their societies,
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thus reinforcing a consistent political vocabulary(Meyer 1966).
The authoritarian regimes of Southern Europe and Latin America reflected a greater
variety of motivating ideas, including nationalism, corporatism, fascism, populism, and later
neoliberalism, thus making their classification on the left-right spectrum less straightforward
than that of communist regimes (Freeden, Sargent and Stears 2013; Linz 2000). However,
“anti-communism” provided a unifying right-wing identity for the diverse political factions
that underpinned regimes in Southern Europe and Latin America. In the case of Francoist
Spain, the theme of anti-communism endured to the regime’s very end, culminating in the
controversy surrounding the legalization of the Spanish Communist Party in 1977 (Linz
and Stepan 1996: 96). Likewise, anti-communism was a central unifying, motivating, and
legitimizing element for Salazar’s Estado Novo in Portugal (Pinto and Rezola 2007) and for
the Greek Junta (Kornetis 2013).
The centrality of anti-communism to regime ‘mentalities’ is particularly apparent in Cold
War Latin America (Brands 2010, 241-42). Most of the Latin American regimes arose to
prevent a pro-Soviet government from taking power or to fight left-wing insurgencies and
were thus viewed as “right-wing” by virtue of playing an anti-communist role (see Appendix
B for the ideological orientations of Latin American regimes).1 Brands 2010 goes even so far
as to claim that the post-Cold War “destruction of the Left [...] robbed these governments of
their reason for being” leading to the collapse of the Latin American authoritarian regimes.
The strong association between military coups and the right is even apparent in regime
classifications that combine the two elements creating a distinct category of “right-wing
authoritarianism” (e.g. Alvarez et al. 1996).
1 Exceptions to the anti-communist trend in Latin America are not absent of course; Castro’s
Cuba or Nicaragua’s Sandinista regime are examples of clearly leftist regimes that openly
aligned with the Soviet Union. Several Latin American regimes (most notably Peru under
General Juan Velasco Alvarado’s rule (1968-1975)) primarily pursued populist and national
reform policies thus making their right-wing associations less clear, but again in so far as
they pursued a vigorous anti-communist policy these regimes were far more likely to be
associated with the right (See Appendix B).
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If citizens are aware of the ideological orientation of the preceding regime, how will they
evaluate the ideological label associated with old regime? We argue that there are at least
three reasons as to why people in the post-transition period may not be willing to identify
themselves with the prior regime’s tainted brand. First, with the demise of an authoritarian
regime, we expect the various mechanisms that generated compliance and support to cease
functioning, thus leaving only the negative memories of the repressive aspects. Second, people
who had kept their true preferences concealed through preference falsification (Kuran 1997;
Lohmann 1994) now have incentives to openly display their dislike for past regime. Third,
new social and political pressures can stigmatize support for the old regime’s brand. These
pressures include the new political discourse driven by political elites striving to bolster their
legitimacy by emphasizing their break from the past, as well as the newly open statement
of preferences by the segments of society that had not supported the regime before. We
presume that this constellation of social and political forces can tip the balance far enough
to render identifying with the old regime’s brand and associated parties socially unacceptable
and even trigger new forms of preference falsification whereby supporters of the old regime
conceal their preferences in the new environment and are reluctant to self-identify with the
brand of the old regime. In future research these individual mechanisms can be unpacked,
but in this paper we focus on the overall effect that they have on left-right placement in the
post-transition period.
But what about the legacies of genuine support for the old authoritarian regime? Of
course, there is a distribution of preferences in any given society which means that some
sections of the population did sincerely support the authoritarian regimes. Furthermore,
authoritarian regimes had various means of building popular support for example through
co-optation (Magaloni 2006), economic goods provision (Desai, Olofsgård and Yousef 2009),
and propaganda (Chen and Xu 2017) among others. However after democratization, these
mechanisms would cease to operate leading to a collapse in prior levels of support. One
could still expect a lagged effect if specific authoritarian regimes were better at economic
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goods provision than the democratic governments that replaced them. But on the whole, we
would still expect a considerable portion of the population to lean against the authoritarian
regime.
Repression, on the other hand. while unifying feature of authoritarian regimes, may
gain compliance (Kuran 1997) but is counter-productive in terms of gaining sincere popular
support (Gerschewski 2018; Guriev and Treisman N.d.). Indeed the literature on author-
itarian nostalgia suggests there has been and continues to be very little support for the
purely repressive aspects of authoritarianism. Even in post-communist countries, where the
phenomenon of “communist nostalgia” (Ekman and Linde 2005; Gherghina and Klymenko
2012), as well as critical attitudes towards democracy are well documented (Neundorf 2010;
Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017), it is clear few citizens yearn for the purely authoritarian
aspects of the communist form of government (Mishler and Rose 1996; White 2010). Mishler
and Rose (1996, p. 43) find that only a minority, about 3%, endorsed all five “authoritar-
ian” elements of a government type, and the most favoured “authoritarian” element was a
technocratic management of the economy by economists. Overall, “communist nostalgia”
appears to combine a yearning economic benefits of communism (White 2010) with a cul-
tural identity as a communist citizen (Bartmanski 2011; Gherghina and Klymenko 2012).
Likewise, in Latin America, where various accounts stress a latent cultural predisposition
towards authoritarianism (see Tiano 1986, for a review), public opinion seems to be largely
in favour of democracy both before the start (Geddes and Zaller 1989) and after the end of
the authoritarian regime (Carlin and Singer 2011, 1509). Extensive survey evidence from
Latin America has challenged the perception of an authoritarian culture, portraying a citi-
zenry with pro-democratic values (Booth and Seligson 1984; Tiano 1986) and across at least
eight countries, Latin Americans prefer elected democracy to an unelected strongman by a
ratio of about five to one (Booth and Seligson 2009). Even allowing for variation in support
for democracy and nostalgia across and within these countries, there are grounds for some
degree of rejection of the authoritarian past.
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The tendency to disassociate from the ideological “brand” of the prior illiberal regime is
clearly apparent in the behavior of party elites in new democracies. In the post-communist
context, former Communist parties were largely discredited and shunned by other parties
(Ishiyama 1995; Mahr and Nagle 1995). The instances of "success" are attributed to their
ability to either re-brand themselves as social democratic parties (Grzymala-Busse 2002), ob-
fuscate their links through ‘ideological flexibility’ (Pop-Eleches 2008), or rely on the historical
weakness of the anti-communist opposition (Spirova 2008). To protect their anti-communist
reputation, several ex-Communist parties have implemented economic liberalization despite
their promises to the contrary in party manifestos (Tavits and Letki 2009) and some of
them even initiated lustration policies (Letki 2002). Insofar as elite behavior carries some
reflection of popular demand, we can infer that in post-communist countries, the communist
brand was penalised to some extent by voters.
In Latin America, political elites have shown a reluctance to be labelled “right-wing.”
Studies of Brazilian political elites have recorded a long-term tendency towards what has
been known as the direita envergohada (‘ashamed right’): politicians place themselves to
the left of their actual positions and they refuse to label themselves as “right-wing” (Pierucci
1987; Power and Zucco Jr 2009). The reluctance of political elites to label themselves right-
wing may explain the high level of confusion in LR self-placement among latent ‘rightists’ in
the Brazilian electorate (Ames and Smith 2010). By the same token, PSR, the main right-
wing party in Portugal, has avoided using a name that would link it to any common party
family of the right. Rather it opted to call itself ‘social democratic.’ Some studies have
argued that Spain and Portugal have been rendered immune to far-right populist parties
despite the recent grave political and financial crises precisely because of their experience of
four decades of right-wing authoritarianism (González-Enríquez 2017). Likewise, the Greek
socialist party has traditionally exploited memories of the turbulent and polarized period
that led to the 1967 right-wing military coup in its campaign strategy (Dinas 2017).
To conclude, for anti-dictator bias to appear in the post-democratization period it is
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enough that a non-trivial proportion of the population associated the old regime with either
the left or the right and did not sincerely support the old regime—and this group is likely
to be present as authoritarian regimes do not need support from everyone to survive (Kuran
1997). At the very least we would expect a new and cross-cutting cleavage between old and
new regime supporters in the new party system (Torcal and Mainwaring 2003; Tucker 2006).
Combining the two parts of our argumentation leads us to our main hypothesis:
H1:In post-authoritarian regimes, individuals will have a bias against the ideological label of
the prior illiberal regime.
This hypothesis can be further decomposed, according to the ideological label of the illiberal
regime:
H1A: If a country had a left-wing illiberal regime, we expect an anti-left bias under democracy.
H1B: If a country had a right-wing illiberal regime, we expect anti-right bias under democracy.
Apart from testing these hypotheses, we try to validate our argument by exploring sources
of variation in the resulting degree of anti-dictator bias. We propose that the two main
characteristics of autocracies will underlie this variation: the intensity of the repression
and indoctrination used by the old regime. A particularly brutal and memorable record
of repression that violates basic human rights, which are seen as integral to democracy,
is likely to fuel the regime’s bad reputation. Hard repression (Levitsky and Way 2010)
is more likely to undermine legitimacy than subtler forms (Escribà-Folch 2013), increase
opposition (Davenport 2007), and the demand for transitional justice after democratization
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 2013). Thus repression is likely to increase the proportion of people
who lack sincere support for the old regime and fuel the anti-dictator political discourse.
Indoctrination by the old regime, on the other hand, should mitigate anti-dictator bias.
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Successful inculcation of the population with regime’s guiding idea (Brandenberger 2014)
helps people rationalize the need for repression (Adler 2012) and creates a religious-like
devotion to the regime (Gentile 2013). Indoctrination has particularly durable effects due to
its reliance on education (Alesina and Reich 2013) targeted at the impressionable young as
well as due to the creation of new social identities (Fitzpatrick and Ludtke 2009). We thus
expect the legacies of indoctrination and repression to modify the overall level of anti-dictator
bias in countervailing directions.
Data and Research Design
We understand anti-dictator bias as the tendency of people to place themselves further away
from either end of the left-right continuum than they would without negative associations
with the old regime’s ideological side. In other words, the ideology of the old regime, in the
sense of an association with the ideological label “left” or “right”, serves as the treatment
(Right for right-wing and Left for left-wing), which determines peoples’ self-placement on
the left-right scale: following a right-wing regime, people will place themselves to the left,
and following a left-wing regime, to right. However, in order to test for the presence of anti-
dictator bias, we need a benchmark against which to judge what is more “left” or “right.”
To address this challenge, we use established democracies as the comparison group. We
define established democracies as countries that had uninterrupted democratic rule since
WWII. We assume that in these countries there exists no anti-dictator bias by the time our
first surveys are available (early 1970s). We do not assume that established democracies
do not display left or right-wing tendencies but rather that the ideological “brand” of the
pre-democratic regime has no effect. All these first-wave democracies democratized slowly,
reaching full democracy well before WWII (Huntington 1993), and while some experienced
a brief authoritarian interlude (i.e. Nazi occupation), it was sufficiently short and far in the
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past to have a neutral effect on LR self-placement.2
Using established democracies as the benchmark has two further advantages. Firstly,
established democracies can be used as the point of comparison for both left and right-wing
regime types facilitating a comparison between the two latter groups. Secondly, the use of
established democracies as the comparison group accounts for period effects such as general
swings in public opinion that affect people cross-nationally.
We pool several cross-national surveys that include a left-right self-placement item: the
World Values Survey, the European Social Survey, the European Elections Studies, the
Latinobarometer, the Eurobarometer and the Central and Eastern European Barometer
surveys. In total, our surveys cover 50 countries in the period from 1970 to 2012. This
results into 950 country-years and about two million individuals.3
The scatterplots in Figure 2 summarize the data by showing the average LR self-placement
in each survey for the three groups of countries: new democracies following left and right-
wing regimes and established democracies. Each dot represents a country-year survey and
their size is proportional to the survey’s effective sample (excluding observations with miss-
ing LR values). Local smoothing functions summarize the overtime trajectory suggesting
that people in new democracies which followed right-wing regimes are the most left-wing—
more left-wing than people in post-Communist countries and established democracies. Also,
people in both groups of new democracies show trends towards more right-wing placements
as time passes since the transitions, but this trend stabilizes in post-right-wing democracies.
However, Figure 2 also illustrates the difficulties arising from direct comparisons between
post-LW and post-RW new democracies. Since the timing of the transition varies between
countries, all surveys from post-authoritarian countries (first panel of the graph) are sorted
according to the year of fieldwork relative to the year of regime change. This variation
makes a direct comparison of the two curves for the new democracies problematic—in doing
2 We relax this assumption in some analyses, as explained in the next section.
3 Details of the years and countries covered in Appendix A of the Online Appendix (OA)).
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Figure 2: Descriptive Statistics
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Note: The first panel shows the surveys available in post-authoritarian regimes, distinguishing between post-
LW and post-RW democracies with red and blue respectively. The right panel presents the consolidated
democracies. Each point denotes the average LR self-placement. The horizontal axis denotes the years since
transition for the post-authoritarian regimes and the actual survey year for the consolidated democracies.
The curves denote local regression curves (span=1).
so, period effects would be ignored. This problem illustrates why established democracies
are needed as the common point of comparison.
To further clarify how we construct this comparison between the “treated” new democ-
racies and untreated established democracies, we present the main equation used in our
analysis. Assuming that the authoritarian regime of a country j ends at year c, the resulting
equation takes the following form:
LRijt̃ = α + βLeftj + γRightj + δT̃t̃ + Surveyk + uijt̃ (1)
where t̃ = t − c denotes the number of years elapsed since the old regime ended, i indexes
individuals, T̃ denotes a time trend, centered with respect to the transition year„ thus T̃ =
{0, . . . ,W}, and Leftj andRightj switch on for left and right-wing dictatorships respectively
(with established democracies as reference category). We also include a dummy for each type
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of study (EES, ESS, WVS, Latinobarometer, Eurobarometer, CEE barometer, thus k = 5).
Centering time with respect to the year of regime-end means that the effect of Right and
Left is evaluated at year c = 0, i.e. right after the end of the authoritarian rule.
The problem is we cannot readily estimate LR self-placement at year T̃ for established
democracies, because c does not exist for them; we need to infer it. For example, for a
country such as Hungary, which democratized in 1990, a survey in year 2000 would provide
responses ten years after the transition. For the control group we would like to take people
from established democracies from the same period i.e. those surveyed in 2000. Indeed,
when using established democracies against left-wing regimes, we assume c=1990, which
corresponds closely with regime-change year in most of these countries. To keep the analysis
compact, we use the same c for post-RW democracies. Doing so allows us to employ the same
equation for both sets of analyses. Yet, acknowledging that many RW regimes democratized
before 1990 (e.g. Argentina 1983; El Salvador 1985), we replicate the analysis only for the
right, using different c’s: 1975, 1980 and 1985.
We extend this estimation in various ways. First, we add a series of time polynomials
to better capture the effect of time since regime end. Second, we add various pre-treatment
covariates: GDP per capita, infant mortality, the rate of urban population, education in-
equality, and colonial status.4 For the right-wing countries we use the average between
1990-1920. This information is not always available for some of the left-wing regimes and
thus we take the average for the period 1925-1935. All data come from the Varieties of
Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al. 2017). Finally, in some specifications we also
include individual-level controls gender (age with two polynomials, education and level of
religiosity, fully factorized) and post-treatment country characteristics: unemployment, in-
flation, growth and inequality during the time of the survey (International Monetary Fund:
4 V-Dem variable details and names: GDP per capita, logged, base 10 (e_migdppcln);
Infant mortality rate (e_peinfmor); Education inequality measure (v2peedueq) based on
an expert evaluation of extent high quality basic education guaranteed to all; Colonial
status (v2svdomaut) measure based on an expert evaluation of extent domestic policies
autonomous from other states.
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World Economic Outlook Database 2018; Solt 2016).
Moreover, we explore the presence of moderator effects, by looking at the role of time
and cohorts. Taking into consideration the full time span after democratic democratization
helps us to gauge the longevity of anti-dictator bias. We do this by interacting T̃t̃ with both
Left and Right:
LRijt̃ = α + β1Leftj + γ1Rightj + δT̃t̃ + β2Leftj × T̃t̃ + γ2Rightj × T̃t̃
+Surveyk + vijt̃ (2)
where β1 and β2 × T̃t̃ provide the average difference in LR self-placement between left-wing
dictatorships and old democracies from year zero up to year W̃ . Using γ1 and γ2 × T̃t̃, we
take the equivalent information but for the right. Similar to the previous analysis, we use
various specifications, which include pre- and post-treatment covariates as well as higher
time polynomials.
Next, we look into cohort-specific effects. The rationale behind this exercise is that
we should not expect all respondents to have been equally affected by the ideological la-
bel of the authoritarian past. At the very least we expect some difference between people
who experienced the regime and people who did not. We extend equation (1), to account
for between-cohort differences. To identify cohort effects against period and ageing effects,
we apply an augmented difference-in-differences design, as suggested by (Dinas and Stoker
2014). Instead of comparing different cohorts of the same group of countries, we compare
same cohorts of different group of countries: post-LW democracies, and post-RW democra-
cies against established democracies. We also include four time polynomials, interacted with
both Left and Right. This specification allows us to identify cohort effects without having
to assume that ageing or period effects are zero. Rather, we simply assume that ageing ef-
fects in LR self-placement operate in the same way in both new and established democracies.
Building on this idea, we can estimate cohort effects for each cohort in the analysis, thus
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allowing the data to reveal any between-cohort differences. No artificial groups of cohorts
are used:
LRijt̃ = α + β1Leftj + γ1Rightj + δξT̃
ξ
t̃
+ δRξT̃
ξ
t̃
×Right+ δLξT̃ ξt̃ × Left
+λmCohortm + βmCohortm × Left+ γmCohortm ×Right+ Surveyk + eijt̃ (3)
where c = 1990, ξ = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and m = {1931, . . . , 1993, post− 1993}. Post-1993 includes
all respondents born after 1993. Since we only include respondents born later than 1929,
β1 and γ1 estimate the difference in LR self-placement between right, left and established
democracies for everyone born in 1930. β1 + βm and γ1 + γm estimate the same difference in
LR self-placement for each next cohort, born between 1931 and up to post-1993, comparing
the post-LW and post-RW regimes respectively against the established democracies. As a
last step in this set of analyses, we combine time and cohort effects by looking at how cohort
effects evolve along the process of party system consolidation. We combine equations 2 and
3 into a single encompassing model that allows for cohort-effects to vary over time.
Finally, we try to tap into two possible modifiers of anti-dictator bias, namely the role of
repression and indoctrination. We explore variation in both of these components within each
regime. Making use of the V-Dem indicators, we employ a ready measure of repression and
construct an index of indoctrination. With regards to the former we use the Civil Liberties
Scale (v2x_civlib), which is the broadest measure, covering the threat of physical violence
as well as freedom of expression. We take the average level of repression over the duration
of each regime as an indicator of the overall level of repression used by each regime.
To measure indoctrination we have created an index using individual V-Dem indicators
to capture the key elements/tools of indoctrination: (1) the monopolization of the public
discourse and exclusion of alternative views, (2) the presence of a clear ideology, (3) the
control and exclusion of organizations that could provide alternative views, and (4) the
presence of regime-controlled institutions that have mass penetration of society such as mass
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membership organizations and a developed education system (See Appendix C of the Online
Appendix for full details).5 As with repression, we take the average level of indoctrination
over the duration of each regime.
Results
Table 1 shows the results from Equation 1. The first row denotes new democracies fol-
lowing right-wing regimes whereas the second row denotes democracies following left-wing
regimes, that is post-communist Eastern Europe and Nicaragua. Respondents from es-
tablished democracies are the reference category. Going across the columns, we gradually
increase the number of various controls included in the model: firstly survey-fixed effects
and a time trend (1), then we add “pre-treatment” controls (2), followed by “post-treatment”
controls such as individual level demographics and post-transition economic conditions.
Looking at the right-wing dictatorships, we find that across all columns of Table 1 re-
spondents are on average more left-wing than respondents of both left-wing dictatorships and
those of established democracies. The effect amounts to an approximately 0.3 increase in a 0
to 10 scale. Given that the average LR self-placement in established democracies during this
period is 4.81, the effect amounts to a 6% decline in LR self-placement. Although this seems
a modest effect, it is equivalent to the difference between secondary and tertiary education
in an analysis using survey data from Germany (Barberá et al. 2017) and is approximately
half of the effect of having a parent leaning to the left (Rico and Jennings 2016). The effect
seems robust across all model specifications.
To what extent are these results driven by over-time heterogeneity? We address this
question by estimating Equation 2. The results are summarized in Figure 3. We find an
interesting temporal trend.6 Although there seems to be an anti-dictator bias throughout
5 In the OA we explain the rationale behind the construction of the scale and we assess the
sensitivity of our main results to alternative measurement assumptions.
6 Detailed results are shown in Table D.1 of the Online Appendix.
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Table 1: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Right -0.217∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗ -0.320∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.079) (0.104) (0.114)
Left -0.044 0.079 0.003 0.0192
(0.056) (0.099) (0.119) (0.118)
Survey-FE
Time Trend
Pre-WWII
controls
Individual-level
controls
Post-Transition
Controls
n 1168471 947214 511444 471039
n of clusters 787 602 471 431
Entries are OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors, clustered
at the country-year level, in parentheses. c is defined as 1990 for
established democracies, which are employed as the baseline category.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
the first two decades after the authoritarian rule, this bias decreases with time as the new
democracies consolidate. At least two explanations can be given for this pattern: learning
and generational replacement. Democratic learning implies that the accumulated experience
of the new political regime and its actors will challenge, qualify or contradict the ideological
biases related to the previous regime. Generational replacement implies that the new cohorts
replacing the older ones are less distinct from those in established democracies. These two
explanations can of course work in parallel and reinforce one another.
Before moving to the post-LW democracies, it is important to assess the robustness of
these results. To do so, we perform a series of tests. First, we add up to four time polyno-
mials in Equation 1, but all results remain substantively identical (Table D.2 of the Online
Appendix). Second, to ensure that we are not capitalizing on a potential right-wing shift in
industrialized democracies after the end of the cold war, we employ alternative starting years
for these countries: 1975, 1980, and 1985. The results are very similar to those obtained
when using 1990 as the starting point for old democracies (Tables D.3-D.5, Figures D1.-D.3
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in Online Appendix). Third, the results remain robust when we exclude Austria, Italy and
Germany from the group of control countries or code them as right-wing regimes (Figures
D.4 and D.5). Fourth, we implement the analysis at the country×year level, averaging LR
self-placements for each survey year in each country. The results are substantively identical
to those presented here (Table D.6, Figure D.6 in the Online Appendix). Fifth, we repeat
the analysis using only a binary indicator denoting right-wing respondents (coded as those
above five in the (0-10) LR scale).7 The results, shown in the Online Appendix (Tables
D.7-D.10, Figure D.7), remain very similar to those presented here. Sixth, focusing on the
over-time trajectory of the bias, we examine whether we still observe convergence when al-
lowing for a very flexible specification of time. We use year dummies, which we interact with
the indicators of right-wing regimes. The results are shown in the Online Appendix (Figure
D.8) and largely confirm the pattern of convergence found in the main analysis. Seventh,
to enhance the cultural and historical similarity between right-wing dictatorships and the
control group used as the benchmark, we use as a comparison unit a Latin America country,
which did not encounter a right-wing military regime, namely Costa Rica. We employ the
same c points as when using established democracies as control group. Tables D.11 and
D.12 present the average effects, whereas Figure D.9 denotes the over-time trajectory. The
results confirm the patterns found here. Finally, to assess the sensitivity of the results to
the choice of the benchmark group, we sequentially exclude one country from the control
group. All results, shown in the Online Appendix (Tables D.13-D.20, Figures D.10-D.17),
are substantively identical to those presented here.
We now turn to post-LW new democracies. We see that people in post-communist East-
ern Europe on the whole are not significantly different in their LR self-placement compared
to established democracies. The magnitude of the effects is five to ten times smaller than
7 The rationale for this test is that although a binary indicator might lose information, it
can be more readily comparable across countries. Although differences may exist about
fine-grained scales, people, on the whole, tend to agree that values above five is right-wing
and below five, left-wing (Bølstad and Dinas 2017).
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Figure 3: Over-time trajectory of LR self-placement, comparing left- and right-
wing dictatorships with established democracies.
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Note: The blue lines denote the difference in LR placement between right-wing dictatorships and
established democracies, while the dashed curves denote the 95% confidence intervals.
for post-RW democracies. It never achieves conventional levels of statistical significance and
changes sign across specifications. When decomposing these effects over time, the findings
remain ambiguous, as shown in Figure 3: in the first model people in Eastern Europe appear
to be slightly more left-wing in the early transition period, but this effect quickly ceases
to be statistically significant at the 5% level. Moreover, the pattern seems to change re-
markably when post-treatment controls are included. Yet, differences remain non-significant
throughout the analysis.8
8 Despite the lack of significant and coherent differences between post-LW new democracies
and established democracies, for completeness we implement all robustness tests we also
implemented for the right (with the exception of Costa Rica). The results are shown in
the Online Appendix, together with the results for post-RW new democracies.
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No anti-dictator bias for the Left?
So why is there clear evidence of anti-dictator bias (anti-right) in democracies following right-
wing regimes but no discernible anti-dictator bias following left-wing communist regimes? We
believe this difference is the result of Communist regimes being better at indoctrination than
military regimes, and having successfully built lasting left-wing identities and preferences
among their citizens. Communist regimes were more efficient at indoctrination for two
reasons: they possessed a highly developed ideology rather than vague ’mentality’ (Linz
2000) and an institutional structure that facilitated indoctrination.
Firstly, a developed ideology is easier to teach in mass education (Kenez 1985; Zajda
1988), it enables psychological and emotional identification with the regime, and is more
appealing to intellectuals and the youth (Arendt 1973; Fitzpatrick and Ludtke 2009). Fur-
thermore, Communist ideology was underpinned by a body of widely-accessible Marxist-
Leninist literature further facilitating consistency in teaching and policy-making. Military
regimes, on the other hand, mainly justified their existence based on some external threat,
as manifested by the declarations of regime principles issued after coups (examples include
Papadopoulos’s “Our Creed” in Greece or Pinochet’s “Declaration of Principles” in Chile).
A vague guiding aim had the advantage of blunting cleavages in the coalition backing the
regime, but at the same time it severely limited the capacity to socialize the masses into
supporting the regime.
Secondly, the presence of a single mass-membership party not only increased regime
longevity (Geddes 1999; Smith 2005), but also maximized penetration and control of so-
ciety by fostering unified group identity across all state, social and economic institutions
(e.g. schools, universities, youth groups, and workplaces). Military-authoritarian regimes,
on other hand, were limited by the military-civilian divide: even if officer training could
serve as means of indoctrination (as in the case of the teaching of “New Professionalism” in
Brazilian military academies), it operated only within the military sphere. Also right-wing
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regimes relied on the Catholic Church to assist with education and indoctrination in the
early 20th century. However, following the Second Vatican Council in 1958, the Church offi-
cially supported the cause of democracy curtailing any unequivocal support of authoritarian
regimes (Philpott 2004).9
There is no doubt that long-lived illiberal regimes experienced fluctuations in levels of
indoctrination and repression (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2013, 2014). However, we can ex-
pect communist regimes to be on average more effective at indoctrination than right-wing
regimes. Also it has already been shown that increased exposure to communist indoctrina-
tion significantly reinforces pro-left self-placement (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017).
Figure 4: Repression and Indoctrination across different types of regimes.
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Note: Each boxplot summarizes the distribution of indoctrination (Panel A) and repression (Panel B)
across the three types of regimes. The Online Appendix explains in detail how both measures have been
constructed.
To test this argument, we first try to gauge the level of repression and indoctrination
across different regimes. Figure 4 shows that levels of indoctrination among communist
9 In a few exceptions the Church took a neutral position, the most notable case being the
unusually emasculated Church in Argentina that was dependent on state funding (Gill
1998; Klaiber 2009).
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regimes were higher than for right-wing regimes and established democracies (the latter
two being statistically indistinguishable). This pattern suggests that the moderating effects
of indoctrination would have been felt much more strongly among left-wing regimes, thus
explaining why in these countries, among the older cohorts, we see positive (pro-left) rather
than negative bias (anti-left) towards the ideological label of the old regime. Of course, this
reasoning assumes that indoctrination and repression are not perfectly related. The second
panel of Figure 4 confirms this assumption: while the levels of repression between left and
right-wing regimes are practically indistinguishable, the levels of indoctrination are much
higher for left-wing than right-wing regimes.
Although suggestive and based on imperfect measures, the pattern shown in Figure 4
indicates that there is indeed some variation in the intentions of the two types of regimes.
The next question is whether this difference in indoctrination intensity leaves any imprint
on attitudes. Although we cannot provide direct evidence about the link between past in-
doctrination and contemporary LR self-placement, we can offer indirect evidence, by looking
at between-cohort heterogeneity. If indoctrination matters, it should matter for those who
directly experienced it because indoctrination ends or changes direction after the end of the
authoritarian regime. We should thus find differences between cohorts that experienced the
regime directly and those that did not.
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Figure 5: Between-cohort differences.
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Year−of−birth Cohorts
D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 L
R
: E
st
ab
lis
he
d 
vs
 N
ew
 D
em
oc
ra
ci
es
●
●
Left−Wing
Regimes
Right−Wing
Regimes
Note: Dots represent the difference between left-wing and established democracies for each birth cohort,
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To see whether this is the case, we estimate equation 3. The results are shown in Figure
5. In this Figure we show predicted difference in LR self-placement between cohorts in new
democracies and established democracies while controlling for the various pre-treatment
effects. We see that in new democracies following right-wing regimes, there is no discernible
between cohort heterogeneity and all cohorts tend to be more left-wing. However, if we look
at post-left-wing new democracies, we find clear cohort heterogeneity that remains constant.
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People born between 1930 and 1950, and who not only experienced the most intense periods
of communist indoctrination but were also exposed to it for the longest period, are more
left-wing than younger cohorts - in other words the experience of indoctrination has pulled
these cohorts to the left. The younger cohorts born from 1950 onwards that missed the
earlier phases of intense communist indoctrination are right-wing as expected. Thus we can
see that the absence of overall anti-dictator bias is driven by the more pro-left older cohorts
out balancing out the younger right-wing cohorts. Thus for cohorts entering political life
after the Stalinist era, we find significant anti-left bias.
Next, we combine the time and cohort effects to look at how cohorts behave over time.
The results are summarized in Figure 6. Again we see an absence of cohort heterogeneity
for most of the time in post-right-wing democracies (the initial heterogeneity fades quickly).
But what we do see is that all cohorts become less left-wing over time thus displaying gradual
convergence. But in post-left-wing new democracies we see that the cohort heterogeneity
remains present over the two decades since democratization. The old cohorts who were
exposed to communist indoctrination remain pro-left whereas the younger cohorts are all
right-wing.
A Direct Look at Repression and Indoctrination
The previous section presented indirect evidence about the role of indoctrination, but it
would be even better to have more direct evidence as to how indoctrination and repression
can modify the level of anti-dictator bias post-transition. Providing such evidence is difficult
not only because the measures are far from perfect but also because they cannot apply
to established democracies, which democratized too long ago. Essentially, therefore, the
analysis has to be made within authoritarian regimes. We try to do this by leveraging the
variation in terms of the degree of repression and indoctrination within each ideological
group, i.e. within left- and right-wing dictatorships. We thus regress LR self-placement
on the level of indoctrination and repression within each group of countries. We include
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Figure 6: The over-time trajectory of cohort effects.
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Note: Dots represent the difference between left-wing, right-wing and established democracies for each
birth cohort, with the vertical spikes denoting the 95% confidence intervals.
the pre-treatment controls as well as controls for regime performance.10 The results are
shown in Table 2. The first two columns of the table present the results for democracies
following RW dictatorships whereas the last two present the results for democracies following
LW dictatorships. Within each group, we use both the binary outcome–the probability of
10Authoritarian regimes can also gain popular support through building "performance-
based legitimacy" by demonstrating certain economic and social outcomes (Grauvogel
and Von Soest 2014). To capture regime performance in terms of quality of life outcomes
we control for average annual improvement (that is decline) in infant mortality. (Source:
V-Dem, variable name: e_peinfmor)
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denoting right-wing self-placement–and the continuous LR self-placement scale. Both sets
of results lend support to our expectations. In the case of new democracies following RW
dictatorships, we see that higher levels of past repression drive people more to the left
whereas higher levels of past indoctrination translate into more right-wing self-placements.
For democracies following LW dictatorships we find the opposite pattern: higher levels of
past repression induce right-wing placements whereas higher levels of past indoctrination
bring people more to the left of the political spectrum.11
A potential criticism to this analysis could be that repression and indoctrination are
already endogenous to prior ideological leanings. This is mainly a concern for right-wing
dictatorships of the WWII, which were largely framed as a solution to the communist threat.
Thus, it might be that support for the left, prior to the authoritarian rule, explains both
the intensity of repression and indoctrination as well as future leanings to the left. To see
whether this is the case, we collect data on the vote share of the left in the last election prior
to the authoritarian rule.12 We implement two sets of analyses. First, we examine whether
prior support for the left predicts either repression or indoctrination afterwards. We find
no evidence for this, as also illustrated graphically in Figure D.20 of the Online Appendix.
Second, we include this variable as an additional control in the analysis for the right; results
are shown in Table D.7 of the Appendix. All effects remain robust to the inclusion of the
covariate.
11We also examined the longevity of these effects over time. We find some evidence of a
decay in the magnitude of these effects in right-wing regimes and much less so in left-wing
regimes, see Figures D.18 and D.19 of the Online Appendix.
12Calculated as the proportion of the total vote share for parties clearly associated with the
label “left” within the given country’s political context (e.g. socialist, social democratic,
or communist parties) in the last election before the start of the authoritarian regime. If
the last election clearly had no meaningful level of political competition, we take the next
preceding election. Election results and vote shares obtained from Nohlen (2005).
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Table 2: Ideological side bias in party preferences.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Left-Wing Countries Right-Wing Countries
Binary Outcome Continuous LR Binary Outcome Continuous LR
Repression -0.237∗ -1.655∗ 0.930∗∗∗ 2.679∗∗
(0.154) (0.957) (0.190) (0.849)
Indoctrination 0.096∗∗ 0.422∗ -0.370∗∗∗ -1.749∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.195) (0.060) (0.285)
Survey Fixed Effects
Time Fixed Effects
Pre-WWII controls
Regime performance
n 280264 280264 81202 81202
n of clusters 192 192 87 87
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the level of the individual. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Implications: Anti-dictator bias in party evaluations
Finally, we attempt to test the theory by looking at an additional observable implication
that it leads to. In particular, we shift our attention from ideological predispositions to party
evaluations. Recent developments in spatial voting literature give pride of place to the role of
group categorization: people, according to this line of research, tend to evaluate objects such
as parties more favourably if they perceive them to be in the same in-group as the individual
and more negatively if not. Importantly, both the premium for being on the same ideological
side and the penalty for being on the opposite side hold independently from the ideological
distance between party and individual (Bølstad and Dinas 2017; Vegetti and Širinić 2019).
Put differently, a left-wing (right-wing) voter prefers a left-wing (right-wing) party over a
right-wing (left-wing) party, even if her ideal point is equidistant to both parties.
We expect anti-dictator bias to accentuate this mechanism. Parties that get categorized
into the category on the opposite side of left-right continuum to the voter will be more
disliked if the opposing end of the left-right spectrum is associated with the old regime.
Being at the opposite side of the voter should incur a penalty in party preference. This
penalty, however, should be even higher if opposite side means also the side of the dictator.
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This implies that although opposite-side should decrease party preferences in both right- and
left-wing regimes, it should do so more when it means the party is right-wing (left-wing) in
countries with right-wing (left-wing) dictator. Thus voters add an additional “penalty” to
opposing parties if those parties are associated with the ideological “brand” of the deposed
dictator.
To test these expectations we need to combine information about voters and parties.
We do this by using Modules 1 through 4 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
(CSES).13 The CSES measures party preferences via a zero (strongly dislike) to ten (strongly
like) scale, which is used as the dependent variable in this analysis. Importantly, CSES also
includes an “expert” placement of each party in the 0-10 LR scale. We use this information
to categorize the party as LW or RW. We regress party preference on: a) proximity between
voters own LR self-placement and the expert placement of the given parties; b) whether or
not the party falls in the same or opposite binary left-right category as the voter;14 and c)
on the interaction between sides and the ideological label of the party, i.e. whether the party
in the same or opposite category to the voter with whether it is left or right-wing (according
the expert placement). We also include individual-fixed effects, thus looking at within-voter
variation across parties. As it becomes evident, this test complements our analysis not only
theoretically but also methodologically. It is based not on between-regime differences but
on differences within the same regime, country, and individual. All that varies is the parties
within the country in a given election.
Table 3 presents the full results while Figure 7 visualizes the main effects. Three points
require highlighting. First, all-else-equal, in post-RW democracies, right-wing parties are
disadvantaged, whereas left-wing parties enjoy a premium in party preference. No such
distinction is found in post-left-wing democracies. Second, in both regimes, controlling for
perceived ideological proximity between party and individual parties that are on the same
13 See the Online Appendix for countries and survey years included in the analysis as well as
variable coding.
14The reference category consists of parties placed by experts at point five.
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Table 3: Ideological side bias in party preferences.
Right-Wing Regimes Left-Wing Regimes
RW Party LW Party RW Party LW Party
ProximityLR -0.536∗∗∗ -0.537∗∗∗ -0.562∗∗∗ -0.563∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Same Side 0.285∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.046) (0.036) (0.026)
Right-Wing Party -0.263∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗
(0.033) (0.028)
Same Side × RW Party 0.229∗∗ 0.060
(0.073) (0.052)
Opposite Side -0.232∗∗∗ -0.715∗∗∗ -0.406∗∗∗ -0.508∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.049) (0.027) (0.034)
Opposite Side × RW Party -0.224∗∗ -0.021
(0.071) (0.050)
Left-Wing Party 0.171∗∗∗ 0.024
(0.032) (0.029)
Same Side × LW Party -0.141 -0.003
(0.072) (0.052)
Opposite× LW Party 0.316∗∗∗ 0.079
(0.070) (0.051)
Constant 6.560∗∗∗ 6.510∗∗∗ 6.879∗∗∗ 6.866∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.022)
Individual-FE
Party-Stack-FE
n 130425 130425 198548 198548
n of clusters 25882 25882 36,758 36,758
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the level of the individual.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
side as the respondent enjoy an additional increase in party preference, whereas parties on
the opposite side suffer a penalty. This finding simply confirms the conclusions by Bølstad
and Dinas (2017). What is more important is to see whether this side-effect varies according
to whether the party in question carries the ideological label of the dictator, i.e. being on
the right in post-RW democracies and on the left in post-LW democracies. Does being on
the opposite side carry a differential penalty for right-wing (left-wing) parties in post-RW
(LW) democracies? As we see in the first column of the table, in post-RW new democracies
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Figure 7: Decomposing Opposite-Side Effects according to party ideology.
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Note: Each entry denotes the average estimated penalty in party preference caused by a party being on the
opposite side than the voter, while controlling for the level of proximity betwene party and voter. The first
panel shows the results from right-wing regimes, whereas the left panel shows the effects from let-wing
regimes. Each dot represents the average estimated effect, while the spikes capture the 95% confidence
intervals.
being on the opposite side is costly for the party only if this means being on the right.15
When being opposite to the respondent means being on the left of the ideological spectrum,
the opposite-side effect diminishes. This is shown in the second row, which illustrates how
the penalty for being on the opposite side is halved for left-wing parties. These effects are
confined to post-RW new democracies. We can discern no additional “penalty” for parties
associated with the left in post-communist countries.
Discussion
Political competition in new democracies has been examined from many angles—social cleav-
ages, party system institutionalisation, and the effects of the transition itself on the formation
of individual preferences, among others—but little attention has been devoted to the over-
15As an interesting note, we also find that in post-RW democracies, RW voters give a pre-
mium to RW parties. This is shown by the positive and significant coefficient for Same
Side X RW Party. This could be evidence of ideological commitment among extreme
voters under conditions of polarization (Svolik 2018).
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arching legacies of authoritarian ideologies. We tried to provide theory and evidence as to
why authoritarian ideology can affect public opinion and party competition after the demo-
cratic transition. The link between ideological sides and authoritarian regimes can generate
a bias against these sides, hence skewing citizens’ LR self-placement in a newly democratized
polity. Importantly, these effects can endure throughout the party consolidation process and
can also impact people’s party preferences. Consistent with our line of argument, repression
intensifies this bias, while indoctrination ameliorates it.
Apart from shedding light on individual LR self-placement in new democracies, the phe-
nomenon of anti-dictator bias has at least five more general implications. Firstly, from the
supply-side perspective, the dynamics of party competition in new democracies must be ex-
amined considering the ideological “brand” of the old regime. To the extent anti-dictator bias
is present, parties might significantly vary policy priorities to match the ideological profile
supposedly favoured by the voters. And to the degree that persuasion effects are important
in new democracies (Lenz 2012), this process might change the public’s understanding of
what policy principles the labels “left” and “right” represent; for example, communist succes-
sor parties pursued free market policies in the 1990s (Tavits and Letki 2009). This pattern
might generate a cycle whereby the historical past continues to inform the meaning of "left"
and "right" labels years, if not decades, after democratization.
Secondly, on the demand-side, this anti-dictator bias can also explain country-level differ-
ences not only in LR placement, but in more specific issues in so far as they come to symbolise
either pole of the left-right continuum. For example, using European Social Survey data from
2002 to 2012, Rueda (2018) examines the determinants of support for redistribution among
14 countries. Figure 1 of this study decomposes national averages into two groups, the poor
and the rich. The three countries the highest support for redistribution among the rich
are Greece, Portugal and Spain. By the same token, Bansak, Hainmueller and Hangart-
ner (2016) ran a comparative survey across 15 European countries after the refugee crisis
and found that the country with most pro-asylum seekers attitudes was Spain, whereas the
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country with lowest percentage wanting more asylum seekers in their own country being
Czechia. In other words policies that fall into ideological category favoured by the voters
are also favoured, whereas issues that are associated with the opposing category are disliked.
Although non-systematic, this evidence is at least indicative of the potential spill over of
anti-dictator bias on newly salient policy issues.
Third, the findings highlight the influence of authoritarian indoctrination on individual
LR self-identification and preferences. Where indoctrination has been successful, mainly in
post-Communist countries, the contrast between the tainted ideological brand of the old
regime and the public preferences for some elements of the authoritarian ideology implies
powerful contradictory pressures on party competition. Under these conditions, parties try
to choose between emphasizing a break with the past that can boost their credibility and
capitalizing on pro-left sentiments among older generation in the case of Eastern Europe.
Taking this idea further is impossible without more systematic knowledge about how in-
doctrination played out in these regimes. In a way, the findings from this study showcase
the importance of better understanding how authoritarian indoctrination works and how
its mechanisms breakdown after democratization. This understanding is key to enhancing
our knowledge about how political memory travels across generations. Even for the well-
studied Eastern European countries, we know very little about the extent a pro-left parental
influence on new generations is counter-balanced by post-transition influences such as the
anti-communist political discourse. Adding indoctrination into the analysis sheds light on
seemingly paradoxical phenomena, such as “communist nostalgia,” which combines support
for the communist aim of social equality with democratic human rights and freedoms (White
2007).
Fourth, the presence of history-driven bias in LR self-placement has important implica-
tions for party positioning in new democracies. The main party representing the ideological
side of the old regime is likely to receive support from sympathizers or those who make no
connections between political ideology and the old regime. However, this party is also likely
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to suffer contrast effects. In the presence of anti-dictator bias, the party associated with
the dictator is placed more towards the disliked end of the ideological spectrum not because
of its actual issue positions but because people dislike the party for its associations with
the authoritarian regime. This pattern may explain why the right-wing parties of Greece,
Portugal, and Spain have been constantly treated by their electorates as the most right-wing
in Europe, despite these parties holding relatively moderate right-wing positions according
to their manifestos (Dinas 2017).
Finally, the presence of anti-dictator bias may influence the pattern of party system frag-
mentation in post-authoritarian regimes. Political elites may adjust their behavior in order
to either confront or take advantage of the perceptual distortions generated by the bias
against the ideological "brand" of the old regime. This means that we should see more polit-
ical actors embracing the opposite side of the left-right continuum. Accordingly, one would
expect asymmetric levels of party system fragmentation, with fewer parties located on the
dictator’s ideological side. Following the public opinion dynamics, this asymmetry is likely
to decline along the process of party system institutionalization. Further research into the
supply-side implications of anti-dictator bias could thus shed light on these multidimensional
facets of anti-authoritarian bias.
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